The 2015 Turkish General Election: Mobilisational symmetry and another major victory for democracy

Toygar Sinan Baykan

On June 7th 2015 over 47 million people, almost 84% of the electorate, went to the polls in Turkey. The pre-election period was extremely tense as a result of the years-long divisive interventions of the founder and leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) – and, since summer 2014, the President of the Turkish Republic – Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Besides Erdogan’s divisive personality and political style, corruption allegations against the JDP-led government – and the government’s claims that these allegations were a plot hatched by a Gulenist “parallel state” in the judiciary and the security services – made this election a particularly critical one for the ruling JDP. Given this background, with allegations of corruption in government circles and claims about the ruling party’s authoritarian tendencies, the JDP’s position in the pre-election period was rather disadvantaged despite the public resources available to it. Corruption probes against the government and the method chosen by the JDP leadership for coping with these allegations also left deep wounds as far as the rule of law in Turkey was concerned. As a result, the pre-election climate was dominated by a very strong suspicion that the poll would be rigged due to the ruling party’s interventions.

One of the indications that revealed the pressure on the JDP in this particular election was the new party leader and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s and Erdogan’s unprecedented appeal to the religious sentiments of the electorate. Despite all the criticism against his active involvement in the JDP election campaign – because, constitutionally, the President is supposed to be neutral as far as support for specific parties is concerned – Erdogan did not even refrain from showing a Kurdish translation of the holy Quran in one of his speeches in a South-Eastern city before the election. During the campaign the JDP – and, most notably, President Erdogan – emphasized the necessity of a transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. This was seen by the majority of the electorate as further proof of the ruling JDP and Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies.

Unlike previous elections, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (RPP) chose an economy-based and highly redistributive discourse for its electoral campaign. To a great extent, by avoiding a direct response to the JDP’s highly religious appeal in this particular election, this diminished the effect of the ruling party’s propaganda. As an outcome of the increasing normalization of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) also tried to move decisively beyond its Kurdish ethnic electoral base through a strategy of becoming ‘the party of Turkey’ (Turkiyelilesme). Similarly to the RPP, the PDP also deployed some redistributive promises, such as a significant increase in the minimum wage and social support for young people. Another major player in the election, the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), constructed its campaign mainly on the basis of anti-JDP political propaganda which appealed to the reactions of the rightist-nationalist electorate against rumours of corruption and the reforms initiated by the ruling JDP when addressing the Kurdish issue. Another prominent actor in the election was the non-governmental organization Vote and Beyond (Oy ve Otesi), which was organized in order to provide neutral, civilian and grassroots control of the electoral process and protect it against potential fraud.

The election results were, if not shocking, then certainly extremely unpleasant for the JDP. Although the party received almost 41% of the popular vote and won 258 seats, it did not obtain a parliamentary majority. This is: it was not able to form a single-party majority government and the predominant position that it enjoyed in Turkey’s political system for the last 12 years came to an end. The JDP lost almost 9% of its support and 69 parliamentary seats compared to the previous general election. The most decisive external factor in this major failure was the fact that the PDP passed the unusually high 10% electoral threshold and made it into parliament. If the PDP had not taken the risk of participating in the elections as a party and had chosen their conventional strategy of fielding independent candidates, the JDP would have obtained many more seats, providing it with a parliamentary majority, while the PDP would have only have won half of the seats that it actually obtained.

The PDP’s striking electoral success, the party received the 13% of the votes, can be explained by reactions to the further concentration of power in the hands of Erdogan and his desire to consolidate his position even further by introducing of an a la turca presidentialism in which the limits of President’s power are not clear and checks and balances hardly evident. The clearest reaction to this major project of political change came from Selahattin Demirtas, the young and highly telegenic leader of the PDP. Several days prior to the election, Demirtas clearly stated that his party “won’t allow” Erdogan “to become the President”. This, in turn, led many leftists who were against the concentration of power in the hands of Erdogan – and a considerable number of these were likely to have been from the conventional electorate of the RPP – to vote for the PDP. This, as well as the consolidation of the party’s support among mostly Kurdish voters, helped the PDP to pass the electoral threshold with “borrowed votes” (emanet oylar). The PDP raised its vote share by 7% and obtained 80 seats, adding 45 members to its parliamentary group. Another remarkable electoral success story was the far-right NAP. The NAP could easily channel rightist reaction to corruption allegations against the ruling JDP and the government’s reforms regarding the Kurdish issue, and received 16% of the vote. It thus raised its vote share by 3% and obtained 80 seats, an additional 27 compared to the previous election.

The election result also had rather complicated consequences for the centre-left RPP. On the one hand, despite its attempts to become a modern social democratic force by focusing in its political propaganda on income inequalities and the erosion of rights and liberties under JDP rule, the party could not increase its vote share. However, although winning 25% of the vote and 132 seats was not a spectacular success story, the renewal of party policies and outlook under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu was definitely a remarkable political achievement. Kilicdaroglu overcame the nationalist-secularist anxieties of the party’s traditional supporters and brought the party closer to a modern social democratic trajectory. Although hard to capture at first glance, another major strategic achievement of the RPP was the fall of the JDP’s single-party majority government. The RPP leadership refrained from antagonizing its electorate against the PDP by avoiding appeals to Turkish nationalist sentiments on the Kurdish issue. Instead, the RPP intensified its electoral propaganda around redistributive promises and major development projects such as a new city in Anatolia, which was envisaged as a major industrial and transit hub for international trade. The RPP leadership, in a sense, allowed some of its supporters to vote strategically for the leftist appeal of the PDP. In other words, the RPP’s attitude towards the PDP made a vital contribution to the latter’s success in overcoming the 10% electoral threshold and breaking the JDP’s political hegemony.

The most visible outcome of the election is the end of debates surrounding whether the Turkish party system has become (in Sartorian terms) a ‘predominant’ one after several electoral JDP victories. The end of JDP single-party majority government revealed the fact that, despite the party’s unprecedented electoral achievements and robust organization, personalistic leadership and divisive strategies do not sustain a sufficiently institutionalized party which can dominate the party system for decades. Another important consequence was the consolidated polarization of the party system caused by the rise of far-right Turkish nationalist NAP, on the one hand, and the far-left PDP, with its origins in the Kurdish political movement, on the other. Further consolidation of these forces in parliament has increased the polarization of the party system on both the left-right and ethnic axes. Yet, despite political polarization, better representation of these forces in parliament is highly likely to decrease the social tensions stemming from poor representation in the legitimate political space.

Thus, despite the political turmoil in the Middle Eastern region – most notably two failed states to the south of Turkey and the chaos after the Arab Spring in Northern Africa – Turkey has remained a remarkably stable polity in the region alongside Iran. How can one explain the exceptional stability of democracy in Turkey? The conduct of the 2015 general election and the prior rumours that there would be massive electoral fraud committed demonstrate the contribution of a crucial variable to explaining this exceptionality. As recently illustrated by Mufti and previously emphasized by Angrist, what distinguishes Turkey from the rest of the Middle East has been its mobilisational symmetry. In other words, from the very beginning of the multi-party competition, the organizational and mobilisational capacity of the country’s major political actors was more or less equal. This equilibrium of power has protected the country from, on the one hand, the perils of the degeneration of modernising regimes into authoritarianism and, on the other, from a conservative majoritarianism which also gradually developed into authoritarianism. The importance of this mobilisational symmetry was all too evident in this election. Despite widespread rumours about potential electoral fraud, most notably those spread by fuat avni (a Twitter account revealing information most likely stemming from Gulenist ‘deep throats’) via social media, and the exception of some sporadic news, healthy elections could indeed be conducted in Turkey.

Major credit for the fairness of the election should be given to the organizational vigilance of the opposition parties, most notably the grassroots organizations of the NAP and PDP which were able to counterbalance the JDP’s robust organization. In addition to the party organizations, NGOs formed around democratic concerns relating to electoral fraud helped the opposition forces to counterbalance the organizational capacity and state resources deployed by the ruling JDP. In this sense, the ‘Vote and Beyond’ movement created an exemplary situation in which tens-of-thousands of volunteers were deployed as ballot box observers across Turkey. Nevertheless, one should also take into account the true democrats in the JDP headquarters and within the membership party on the ground, whose presence probably did not allow the ruling party to commit extensive voter fraud. Mobilisational symmetry over many years has illustrated the vitality of healthy and safe elections and helped party members to internalise the minimum conditions for democracy: reliable and fair elections. 

The June 7th 2015 Turkish general election represented the third major victory of the democratic method in Turkey. After absorbing the reaction of the conservative-religious segments of Turkish society to modernization in the middle of the Twentieth Century, with the transition to multi-party politics and transforming the Islamist challenge into a centrist and post-Islamist political actor at the end of 1990s, democracy effectively absorbed the ethnic challenge and started to transform pro-Kurdish politics in Turkey. Mobilisational symmetry, a kind of equilibrium of power among competing political parties, has been vital to the victories of democracy in Turkey, and this situation has been grounded in decent ties with Western powers as well as the bureaucratic-institutional “democratic infrastructure” inherited from the modernising Ottoman Empire. In this sense, the EU process has proved itself as an extremely useful leverage for democratization compared to the so-called “exportation of democracy and freedom” by aggressive military-economic means of colonialism and imperialism.

Toygar Sinan Baykan is a doctoral researcher in the University of Sussex, Department of Politics working on a thesis on the role of party organisation and strategy in the electoral success of the Turkish Justice and Development Party.

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Eurosceptic party performances in the 2014 European elections

Giovanni Barbieri

Over the years the issue of European integration has acquired greater salience. Because of the intensification and spread of the economic crisis, the media, politicians and scholars have devoted particular attention to two issues: firstly, the activities of the European Parliament (EP) which, more or less effectively, could tackle the crisis; and, secondly, the consequences of the enlargement process. Nevertheless, turnout in EP elections has been decreasing since 1979, reaching its lowest rate of 43% in 2009 and 2014. Voters, therefore, regarded European elections as “second-order” polls: public opinion accorded little importance to their outcome; voters punished governing parties; while opposition and protest parties achieved their best results. Furthermore, citizens’ trust in European institutions has decreased. The “permissive consensus” toward European integration, which began to decline following the negative outcomes of referendums on European issues, appears to be almost completely eroded. Against this background, one could have expected an excellent performance by the Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections. However, what was the actual outcome? Did Eurosceptic parties truly achieve extraordinary election results? And, if they did, were these results consistent throughout Europe?

A preliminary analysis of the Eurosceptic parties’ electoral performance can be performed by considering the results achieved by those EP political groupings that are typically considered to be Eurosceptic: the soft Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the hard Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), which includes parties adopting both hard and soft Eurosceptic stances. Finally, the Not-attached Members (NA) must also be included in the examination, as they are generally Eurosceptic.

Table 1 shows the electoral results obtained by European political groupings from the first to the most recent EP elections: 

Table 1:  EP political groups 1979-2014 (percentage of MEPs)

1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Epp 26.3 25.3 23.4 27.5 37.2 36.6 36.0 29.4
S&D 27.3 30.0 34.7 34.9 28.8 27.3 25.0 25.4
Alde 9.8 7.1 9.5 7.8 8.0 12.0 11.4 8.9
Ecr 15.4 11.5 6.6 7.3 9.3
Efdd 3.4 2.6 5.1 4.3 6.4
Eul/Ngl 10.7 9.4 8.1 4.9 6.7 5.6 4.8 6.9
Greens/Efa 4.6 8.3 7.4 7.7 5.7 7.5 6.7
Na 2.4 1.6 2.3 4.8 1.4 4.0 3.7 6.9
Others 8.1 10.5 7.1 9.3 7.6 3.7

Source: Elaboration of data from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf and http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html.

In 2014, the European People’s Party (EPP) remained the largest political group in the EP, despite considerable losses. Together with the EPP, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group suffered the worst decline in recent years. Conversely, from 2009 to 2014, the share for all Eurosceptic groups increased. If, for the sake of argument, one were to add the results obtained by the three Eurosceptic EP groups and the NA members, we would have a total of 29.6% of the seats; a plurality not particularly far from the forecasts expressed by many opinion polls before the elections.

To perform a more in-depth analysis, I have also examined data on individual Eurosceptic parties. To define parties as Eurosceptic or not many scholars have considered their official documents – election manifestos, party platforms and leader’s speeches – whereas others have preferred to appeal to expert judgment. The results of these two approaches, of course, do not always correspond with one another. Thus, to develop a list of the Eurosceptic parties that is as detailed and reliable as possible I compared the main analyses on the topic. Table 2 thus presents the final list of the Eurosceptic parties. It includes 62 parties from 26 countries. Eurosceptic parties are present throughout Europe. Moreover, there are no significant differences relating to: territorial distribution, the date of EU accession, or old political and military cleavages.

Table 2 – Results of the Eurosceptic parties in the European elections of 2014

Country

Party Political group Seats (%) Difference Seats Position
2014 2014 2009-14 2014 2014
1 AT FPÖ  Freedom Party of Austria NA 19.7 7.0 4 3
2 EU Stop 2.8 0 6
3 REKOS The Reform Conservatives 1,2 0 8
4 BZÖ Alliance for the Future of Austria 0.5 -4,1 0  9
5 BE Vlaams Belang Flemish Interest NA 4.1 -5.7 1 10
6 BG NFSB/НФСБ The National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria 3.1 0 7
7 ATAKA Attack 3.0 -9.0 0  8
8 CY ΑΚΕΛ – ΑΚΕL Progressive Party of Working People UEN-NGL 27.0 -7.9 2 2
9 ΕΛΑΜ/ELAM National Popular Front 2.7 2.5 0  7
10 CZ KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia UEN-NGL 11.0 -3.2 3 4
11 ODS Civic Democratic Party ECR 7.7 -23.8 2 6
12 Svobodni Party of Free Citizens EFDD 5.2 3.9 1 7
13 Usvit Dawn of Direct Democracy 3.1 0 10
14 DE Die Linke The Left UEN-NGL 7,4 -0,1 7 4
15 AfD Alternative for Germany ECR 7,1 7 5
16 NPD National Democratic Party of Germany NA 1,0 na 1 10
17 REP The Republicans 0,4 -0,9 0  14
18 DK DF Danish People’s Party ECR 26,6 11,8 4 1
19 N. People’s Movement against the EU UEN-NGL 8,0 1,0 1 6
20 EE EIP Estonian Independence Party 1,3 na 0  7
21 EL SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left UEN-NGL 26,6 21,9 6 1
22 X.A. Golden Dawn NA 9,4 8,9 3 3
23 KKE Communist Party of Greece NA 6,1 -2,3 2 6
24 ANEL Independent Greeks ECR 3,5 1 7
25 ΛΑ.Ο.Σ/LA.O.S. Popular Orthodox Rally 2,7 -4,5 0  8
26 ES IU United Left UEN-NGL 10,0 6,3 5 3
27 BNG Galician Nationalist Block UEN-NGL 2,1 -0,4 1 9
28 FI PS Finns Party ECR 12,9 -1,1 2 3
29 FR FN National Front NA 24,9 18,6 23 1
30 PCF French Communist Party UEN-NGL 6,3 0,3 3 6
31 DLR Arise the Republic 3,8 2,1 0 7
32 LO Worker’s Struggle 1,0 -0,2 0 9
33 NPA The New Anticapitalist Party 0,3 -4,6 0  10
34 HR HSP AS Croatian Party of Rights ECR 41,4 1 1
35 HU Jobbik NA 14,7 -0,1 3 2
36 IE SF Sinn Féin UEN-NGL 19,5 8,3 3 4
37 IT M5S Five Star Movement EFDD 21,2 17 2
38 LN Northern League NA 6,2 -4,0 5 4
39 FDI-AN Brothers of Italy-National Alliance 3,7 3,7 0  7
40 LT TT Order and Justice EFDD 14,3 2,0 2 4
41 LV TB/LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom ECR 14,3 6,8 1 2
42 NL PVV Party for Freedom NA 13,3 -3,7 4 3
43 SP Socialist Party UEN-NGL 9,6 2,5 2 5
44 SGP Dutch Reformed Political Party ECR 7,7 0,9 2 7
45 GroenLinks Green Party Greens-EFA 7,0 -1,9 2 8
46 PL PiS Law and Justice ECR 31,8 4,4 19 2
47 KNP Congress of the New Right NA 7,2 4 4
48 SP United Poland 4,0 0  6
49 RN National Movement 1,4 0 9
50 PT PCP Portuguese Communist Party UEN-NGL 12,7 2,1 3 3
51 BE Left Block UEN-NGL 4,6 -6,1 1 5
52 RO PRM Greater Romania Party 2,7 -6,0 0  8
53 SE MP The Green Party Greens-EFA 15,3 4,3 2 4
54 SD Sweden Democrats EFDD 9,7 6,4 2 5
55 V Left Party UEN-NGL 6,3 0,6 1 7
56 C Centre Party ALDE 6,5 1,0 1 6
57 SI SNS Slovenian National Party 4,0 1,2 0  9
58 SK SNS Slovak National Party 3,6 -2,0 0 10
59 L’SNS People’s Party – Our Slovakia 1,7 0  11
60 UK UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party EFDD 26,8 10,7 24 1
61 Cons: Conservative Party ECR 23,3 -3,7 19 3
62 DUP Democratic Unionist Party NA 0,5 0,1 1 10

Source: Elaboration of data from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf and http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html.

More than 30% of these parties were not able to satisfy the electoral thresholds that most countries selected. Furthermore, they failed to achieve satisfactory results throughout Europe. Many parties – such as the Danish DF, Greek SYRIZA, French FN and UK Independence Party – achieved extraordinary success, but others – such as the Bulgarian ATAKA, Cypriot ΑΚΕΛ-ΑΚΕL and Czech ODS – suffered painful defeats. National contexts and political systems, therefore, appear to have played a pivotal role in affecting electoral outcomes.

The electoral results cannot be perceived in a unitary way for Eurosceptic parties, as they include both positive and negative aspects. Clearly, the Eurosceptic parties obtained an unprecedentedly large percentage of votes, but no “political earthquake”, “sweeps”, or “Europe’s populist backlash”, as predicted by much of the press before the elections, occurred. While suffering a decline of 5.1%, the EPP remained the largest group in the EP; former Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker, the leading candidate of the EPP, took charge of the European Commission; and a new grand coalition of the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and ALDE was formed. The Eurosceptic parties, therefore, will not have substantial authority within the EP.

Furthermore, Eurosceptic parties have never been able to form a joint anti-European front both because of their different stances, purposes, aspirations, and, above all, their mutual mistrust. A detailed consideration of the negotiations that the various Eurosceptic parties, especially those in the right-wing camp, undertook to form new EP groups may be extremely useful to clarify this issue. No extreme right or neo-fascist party, such as the Greek X.A. or the Hungarian Jobbik, has ever been allowed to join any EP group. The attempts made by Marine Le Pen, leader of the French FN, and Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch PVV, to form a new political grouping called the European Alliance for Freedom (EFA) failed. The two most prominent figures in the potential alliance managed to ally with the Austrian FPÖ, the Italian LN and the Belgian Vlaams Belang but were unable to secure the necessary support of two additional parties. The negotiations opened by the French FN with the Polish KNP were quickly interrupted by Wilders, who deemed the misogynistic and anti-Semitic positions of its then leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, intolerable.

Nigel Farage, the leader of the UKIP, by contrast, was able to form the EFDD grouping, although this is the smallest EP political grouping and has MEPs from only seven member states. In the first official EFDD meeting after the elections, Farage declared that he would not accept the possible future entry of those parties that supported the formation of the EFA group. Thus it would appear that each Eurosceptic party has a rather negative opinion of its fellow Eurosceptics; in particular, the centre-right parties consider the right-wing parties to be extremists, and neither wishes to have anything to do with the far-right and neo-fascist parties. “He’s worse than me”, could be the statement that best epitomizes the relationships within the Eurosceptic right-wing camp. It should be noted, however, that several Eurosceptic parties – such as the Danish DF, Greek Syriza, the French FN and the UKIP – received the most votes in their respective countries in the EP election, and others – such as the Italian M5S, the Latvian LNNK, and the Polish PiS – secured second place. It would, therefore, appear that these parties were able to move away from the niche positions they have typically held in the electoral market and, thereby, became influential players in the national political arena. In pursuing their goals, they will probably encounter fewer obstacles in the national arena than in the European one.

In conclusion, Eurosceptic parties do not appear to have passed the EP electoral test with flying colours, although their further success could just have been postponed. A further exacerbation of the economic crisis, and/or the inability of the EU institutions in addressing it, could lead such parties toward new and more considerable achievements.

Giovanni Barbieri is Assistant Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Perugia.

What does Andrzej Duda’s victory mean for Europe?

Aleks Szczerbiak 

The right-wing challenger’s unexpected victory in last month’s presidential election has shaken up the Polish political scene but its impact on European politics more generally depends on the outcome of the autumn parliamentary poll. If the opposition wins then this could herald a major change in Poland’s European and foreign policy. If the current ruling party remains in office, the country faces a possibly turbulent period of cohabitation with conflicting foreign policy narratives coming from the two main state organs.

Mainstream or ‘own stream’? 

The shock victory of Andrzej Duda – the candidate of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, the main opposition grouping – over incumbent Bronisław Komorowski, who was backed by the ruling centrist Civic Platform (PO) led by prime minister Ewa Kopacz, in last month’s presidential election has led to speculation as to whether there will be a significant shift in Poland’s international relations. The Polish President is not simply a ceremonial figure and retains some important constitutional powers, notably the right to initiate and veto legislation. However, the President’s competencies are much more limited than those of, say, his French counterpart and real executive power lies with the prime minister, so Mr Duda’s victory will not result in any immediate change in Poland’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, if it is followed up by a change of government after autumn’s parliamentary election then there could be major implications for the country’s relationships with the rest of Europe.

The current Civic Platform-led government’s strategy has been to locate Poland within the so-called ‘European mainstream’ by presenting the country as a reliable and stable EU member state and adopting a positive and constructive approach towards the main EU powers, especially Germany. By locating Poland at the centre of the Union’s decision-making core, the current government claims that it has, in contrast to its Law and Justice predecessor, been effective in promoting the country’s interests at the international level. The appointment last autumn of the then Polish prime minister Donald Tusk as President of the EU Council was presented as the crowning achievement of the government’s strategy of positioning Poland as a ‘model’ European state at the forefront of the EU integration project. 

On the other hand, while it supports Polish EU membership Law and Justice is, in rhetorical terms at least, a broadly anti-federalist (verging on Eurosceptic) party committed to opposing further European integration and defending Polish sovereignty, especially in the moral-cultural sphere where it rejects what it sees as a hegemonic EU liberal-left consensus that undermines Poland’s traditional values and national identity. Law and Justice also argues that Poland needs be more robust in advancing its national interests within the EU rather than simply following European mainstream politics which it sees as being driven by Germany. Indeed, since the outbreak of the eurozone crisis, the party has, if anything, articulated a more fundamental, principled critique of Civic Platform’s support for German-led closer European integration. 

Knowing that he was potentially at a disadvantage on foreign affairs against a more experienced incumbent, Mr Duda was wary of highlighting international issues during the presidential campaign. However, when he did address European and foreign policy Mr Duda also argued that Poland needed to be more assertive in promoting its interests and form its ‘own stream’ that could counter-balance the major EU powers. He called for Poland to ‘recalibrate’ its relationship with Germany which, he argued, should not be pursued at the expense of subordinating the country’s interests. Mr Duda also said that he wanted to revisit the allocation of decision making powers between Brussels and member states to strengthen national sovereignty in areas such as climate policy, where he claimed EU policies were damaging Polish industry.

Scepticism about the euro 

Civic Platform and Law and Justice’s different approaches towards European integration can be seen in their attitudes towards Polish adoption of the euro single currency. For sure, the Civic Platform-led government has toned down its earlier enthusiasm for rapid euro adoption, stressing that it does not have a target date and that this will not occur in the immediate future. Nonetheless, in spite of the turbulence in the single currency area, it remains committed to fulfilling the criteria for eurozone accession as quickly as is realistically possible, as part of its long-term strategic goal for Poland to be at the centre of the EU’s decision-making core. For its part, Law and Justice argues that the country should not adopt the euro until its economy is more closely aligned with the rest of the EU and that any final decision should be approved by a referendum. Indeed, the party has increasingly given the impression that, given the eurozone’s huge internal problems, it could not envisage any point in the foreseeable future when it would be advantageous for Poland to adopt the single currency.

During the presidential election Mr Duda tried to tap into strong public opposition to joining the eurozone – while there is still overwhelming public support for EU membership, most Poles also oppose their country adopting the single currency – and make this into a campaign issue. For example, he visited supermarkets on each side of the border between Poland and Slovakia to show that household groceries were considerably more expensive in its eurozone member neighbour. Mr Komorowski, on the other hand, was an enthusiastic supporter of the single currency who had previously urged the government to accelerate its preparations for eurozone accession; although, sensing his vulnerability, tried to downplay the issue during the election. 

However, although a Law and Justice-led administration will be more assertive in terms of trying to carve out an independent foreign policy and more Eurosceptic in tone, in practice it is not likely to take any radical steps against the EU integration process. It is worth bearing in mind that when it was in government in 2005-7 the party’s rhetorical inter-governmentalism often gave way to a more integrationist approach in practice – for example, signing Poland up to the Lisbon treaty – and that it has never opposed Polish adoption of the euro in principle. In fact, although the issue of Polish-EU relations was highly contested in recent years these divisions were often not about the substance of the European integration project as such but were rather simply an extension of domestic politics by other means, with the two parties treating the EU as a so-called ‘valence’ issue where they competed over which was most competent to pursue a shared goal – in this case, representing and advancing Polish national interests within the Union. 

A more robust Russian policy? 

The difference between the two parties’ foreign policies can also be seen in their approach to developing relations with Russia and Ukraine. Formally they appear to be very similar: both supporting the idea of Poland being at the forefront of efforts to ensure that the international community adopts a robust response to Russian intervention – specifically, that EU sanctions are maintained and extended – and favouring a larger NATO presence in Central Europe. However, Law and Justice claims that the Civic Platform-led government has, notwithstanding occasional flushes of anti-Moscow rhetoric, been constrained by its unwillingness to move too far beyond the EU consensus and act as a counter-balance to the major European powers which are over-conciliatory towards Moscow. The result of this has, it argues, been a failure to conduct a sufficiently active Eastern policy.

Mr Duda and Law and Justice want to sharpen EU and NATO policy towards Russia. They would like to use the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit to strengthen Poland’s defence infrastructure by securing a greater military presence in the country, preferably including permanently stationed US forces or military bases, and locating defensive weaponry on the Alliance’s Eastern flank; something opposed by Germany as too provocative towards Russia. During the election campaign, Mr Duda also called for a stronger Polish presence in international negotiations on Ukraine’s future and policy towards Russia, and indicated that he would consider providing military aid to Ukraine within the framework of the NATO alliance.

More broadly, Law and Justice has sought to contrast what it claims is its accurate diagnosis of Russian motives with the ruling party’s earlier conciliatory approach towards Russian President Vladimir Putin which events in Ukraine have shown to be naïve and short-sighted. As part of this, during the election campaign Mr Duda identified himself with the so-called ‘Jagiellonian policy’ promoted by the late Lech Kaczyński – who was the Law and Justice-backed President between 2005-10, and in whose chancellery Mr Duda worked as a senior legal advisor – which envisaged Poland playing the role of regional leader and building a broad military and political coalition of post-communist East-Central European states to counter Russian expansionism. Mr Duda is likely to try and breathe new life into the Jagiellonian project by re-building alliances with other post-communist states, although this will not be easy given that some of them have even questioned the rationale behind existing EU sanctions against Russia. 

Conflicting foreign policy narratives? 

If Civic Platform wins the autumn election and remains in government, which is still a distinct possibility, then Poland faces a period of up to four years of political cohabitation. Although, according to the Polish Constitution, foreign policy lies within the government’s domain, it also gives the President an informal oversight and co-ordinating role while failing to delineate the two state organs’ respective powers precisely. Moreover, the President can exercise a powerful informal influence through his foreign visits and high profile speeches on international issues. He also ratifies international agreements, so can block treaties negotiated by the government, and is the country’s highest representative and can, for example, try and participate in meetings of the EU Council. So the government has to factor in his position and there is a danger of two conflicting European and foreign policy narratives coming from Warsaw.

Indeed, the previous period of cohabitation between the Civic Platform government and Mr Kaczyński in 2007-10 saw an ongoing power struggle between the government and President, with the former accusing the latter of attempting to pursue a parallel foreign policy. One of the most high profile disputes occurred in October 2008 when Mr Kaczyński and the government clashed bitterly over who had the right to determine the composition of the Polish delegation at that month’s EU Council meeting in Brussels. This ended as a major political embarrassment for Poland as Mr Kaczyński attended the summit against the wishes of the government, which even refused the President use of the official government aircraft forcing him to charter a private jet. Mr Kaczyński and the government also had a number of high-profile disputes over the substance of Poland’s EU policy, the most dramatic being when the President delayed Polish ratification of the Lisbon treaty for eighteen months in 2008-9.

The parliamentary election is the key

Mr Duda’s unexpected presidential election victory will certainly have an impact upon Poland’s relationships with its European partners but its full ramifications depend on the outcome of the parliamentary election. Experience suggests that Law and Justice is often more rhetorically than practically Eurosceptic and that foreign policy divisions between the two main parties are an extension of domestic politics by other means. Nonetheless, if Mr Duda finds himself working with a government with whom he shares a common programme then Poland will certainly be more assertive in pushing forward its interests at the international level independently of the major EU powers. If, on the other hand, we are in for re-run of cohabitation then there is a danger of ongoing clashes between a Law and Justice President and Civic Platform-led government over both their respective competencies and the substance of European and foreign policy.

Aleks Szczerbiak is Professor of Politics and Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex and Co-Convenor of the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN). He blogs regularly about developments on the Polish political scene at http://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com.